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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Christopher Rubey had been riding the Defendant Property 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 
VIN 4B7H8469X35007098. After he got off the motorcycle, law enforcement found over 13 
grams of methamphetamine on Rubey. Rubey was charged with possession with intent to 
deliver, but accepted a plea arrangement and pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled 
substance pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). The Ada County Prosecuting Attorney seeks 
civil forfeiture of the Defendant Property motorcycle pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4). 
A. Factual Background 
On April 22, 2009, Officer Kip Paporello, a Boise City Police Officer, saw Christopher 
Rubey and Cassandra Poulton leave Rubey's manufactured home driving the Defendant Property 
2007 Legendary Motorcycle. R. at 316, 434-35. Officer Paporello also saw a blue truck follow 
the motorcycle. R. at 316-17, 435. Two other officers joined Paporello; and they all observed 
Rubey drive the motorcycle "into various parking lots, gas stations, and residential 
neighborhoods." R. at 317. All three officers, Paporello, Teuber and Holland stated in their 
affidavits that these driving maneuvers are commonly used to avoid surveillance for those 
involved in illegal drug activity. R. at 317, 435. Anthony Pezzaza and Cassandra Poulton's 
infant son were in the blue truck which was stopped by the police at a gas station at Deer Flat. 
R. at 317. Rubey then arrived at the gas station driving the motorcycle. R. at 317, 435. Rubey 
was subjected to a search; and Officer Paporello found approximately 13 grams, or a half of an 
ounce, of suspected methamphetamine inside Rubey's coat. R. at 318, 435. The suspected 
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substance tested positive for methamphetamine. R. at 318, 435. Rubey was charged with 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, but eventually he pled guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine, felony, Idaho Code § 372732(c). R. at 224,435. 
B. Chronology of Proceedings. 
On May 20, 2009, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney filed a Complaint in Magistrate 
Court which named the 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, VIN 4B7H8469X35007098; 
Approximately Thirteen (13) Grams Methamphetamine; One (1) Motorola VGA Cell Phone; 
One (1) Black Vest; and One (1) Black Jacket as the items of defendants property. R. at 5. 
Because of the criminal complaint, the Court stayed the civil forfeiture case pending resolution of 
the criminal proceeding. R. at 49. 
After Rubey pled guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced in 
the criminal proceeding, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on January 4, 2010 in the civil forfeiture case. R. at 63-246. Rubey responded on 
January 15,2010. R. at 254-276. The Magistrate Court heard argument on February 1,2010. 
R. at 313-315. The Magistrate Court issued its Order granting the Ada County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Motion on February 25,2010. R. at 316-328. 
Rubey appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Ada County Prosecuting 
Attorney to the District Court on April 7, 2010 (R. at 329-332), and amended the appeal on April 
15,2010. R. at 342-345. Appellant Rubey's brief was filed on July 28,2010. R. at 374-390. 
Respondent Ada County Prosecuting Attorney filed its brief on August 25,2010 (R. at 391-408) 
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and Appellant Rubey replied on September 15, 2010. R. 409-423. The District Court heard 
argument on the appeal on November 4, 2010 (R. at 428-429); and the District Court issued its 
decision on October 13, 2011 reversing and remanding the Magistrate Court's judgment. R. at 
434-441. The Ada County Prosecuting Attorney appealed the District Court's decision on 
November 8, 2011. 
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court erred in reversing the Magistrate Court's decision that Idaho 
Code § 37-2744(a)(4) allows conveyances to be forfeited when used to transport controlled 
substances. 
III. ST ANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the district court renders an opinion in its intermediate appellate capacity, the 
Supreme Court '''directly reviews the district court's decision.'" Hausladen v. Knoche, 149 
Idaho 449,452,235 P.3d 399,402 (2010) (quoting In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248, 207 P.3d 974, 
979 (2009». "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to free review." 
Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 247 P.3d 644 (2011) (citing Callies v. 
O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130,136 (2009». 
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IV. ARGUMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A. Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) Is Ambiguous so the Court Should Look to Legislative 
History to Determine the Legislature's Intent. 
Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) currently states: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the purpose of distribution or 
receipt of [controlled substances]. 
The Magistrate Court determined that the statute was ambiguous and applied the principles of 
statutory interpretation. R. at 321-322. The Magistrate Court utilized federal case law to 
determine the intent of the Idaho Legislature and found that a vehicle could be forfeited for 
transporting controlled substances. R. at 323-325. The District Court, in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, determined that Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) was not ambiguous, and that the 
phrase "for the purpose of distribution and receipt" applied to the actions described in the statute. 
R. at 439-440. 
The Magistrate Court and the District Court read Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) in different 
ways. When the words in a statute can be read in different ways, the statute "is ambiguous and 
[] this Court must construe the statute 'to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. To 
determine that intent, [this Court] examine[s] not only the literal words of the statute, but also the 
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative 
history.'" Hausladen, 149 Idaho at 452,235 P.3d at 402 (2010) (quoting State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 
326,328,208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009» (which quoted Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 
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Idaho 388, 398-99, III P.3d 73, 83-84 (2005)). Because Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) is 
susceptible to different interpretations, it is ambiguous, and it is appropriate to examine the 
legislative history of the statute. 
1. The Legislative History of § 37-2744(a)(4) and § 37-2732(c) Indicates the 
Legislature Intended that a Conveyance Could Be Forfeited for Either the 
Transportation of Drugs or the Trafficking of Drugs. 
In 1971, the Legislature enacted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. H.B. 261, 41st 
Leg., 1st Extraord. Sess., 1971 Idaho Session Laws 965. The new law subjected to civil 
forfeiture: "all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended 
for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or 
receipt of' controlled substances. Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) (1971). This specific forfeiture 
provision related to conveyances, however, was not made applicable in the case of a violation of 
§ 37-2732(c), Idaho Code, or misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744(a)( 4)(C) (1971 ).1 
1 In 1971, subsection (C) ofIdaho Code § 372744(a)(4) specified: "a conveyance is not 
subject to forfeiture for a violation of section 37-2732(c), Idaho Code." 
Section 37-2732(c) in 1971, as enacted, made it "unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally to possess a controlled substance" and provided that a violation was a misdemeanor. 
H.B. 261. In 1972, § 37-2732(c) was amended to remove "knowingly or intentionally." In 
addition, subsections (c)(1) and (c )(2) were added differentiating between different schedules of 
drugs and the resulting penalties. Section 3 7-2732( c)(1) referred to possession of Schedule I and 
Schedule II drugs and felony penalties while section 37-2732(c)(2) referenced nonnarcotic drugs 
in Schedule I and controlled substances in schedules III, IV and V and misdemeanor penalties. 
H.B. 627, 41st Leg., 2nd Sess., 1972 Idaho Session Laws 273. 
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"[T]he Court must consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine the 
intent of the legislature." Arneritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Aud., 146 Idaho 202, 204, 
192 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2008) (citing Davaaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc. 125 Idaho 333, 336, 
870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994)). When read together, the two statutory provisions, Idaho 
Code § 37-2744(a)(4) and Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) indicate a conveyance could not be subject to 
forfeiture for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance in 1971. Such a reading also 
indicates the Legislature purposefully did not attach the phrase "for the purpose of sale or receipt 
of' or trafficking to the verb "to transport." If the Legislature had intended the reading that 
Rubey suggests, that "any forfeiture authorized under [§ 37-2744(a)( 4)] must involve a 
conveyance used for the purpose of the distribution or receipt of a controlled substance," (R. at 
379) it would have been unnecessary for the Legislature to provide the limiting language in 
§ 37-2744(a)(4)(C) and § 37-2732(c) that misdemeanor possession was insufficient for the 
forfeiture of a vehicle. Rubey suggests reading the verb "to transport" out of the statute. 
Statutory interpretation requires that effect be given to all words so that none are void or 
superfluous. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). In order to 
give meaning to the verb "to transport," it must be read as a separate action from facilitating the 
transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt of controlled substances. 
Further evidence of the Legislature'S intention to make the "transport" of controlled 
substances separate from "in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or 
receipt of' controlled substances is found in later amendments. The Legislature amended Idaho 
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Code § 37-2744(a)(4) in 1972 by expanding the phrase "in any manner to facilitate the 
transportation" to "in any manner to facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or 
concealment." H.B. 627, 41st Leg., 2nd Sess., 1972 Idaho Session Laws 277. The Legislature 
also amended subsection B of § 37-2744(a)(4) to provide: "no conveyance is subject to 
forfeiture under this section if the owner establishes that he could not have known in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence that the conveyance was being used to unlawfully transport,,2 controlled 
substances. Id. (emphasis added). The fact that the Legislature did not amend subsection B to 
state "transport for the purpose of [distribution]30r receipt of' again indicates that the Legislature 
viewed the transportation of a controlled substance differently than facilitating the transportation, 
delivery, receipt, possession or concealment for the purpose of sale or receipt of controlled 
substances. 
The legislative changes enacted in 1990 are the final evidence that the Legislature 
intended that conveyances could be forfeited when drugs were possessed and transported by the 
conveyance. The Legislature repealed § 37-2744(a)(4)(C), that since 1971, had provided a 
conveyance was not subject to forfeiture for certain possession violations found in Idaho Code 
2 In 1986 the Legislature expanded the statute to read: "No conveyance is subject to 
forfeiture under this section if the owner establishes that he could not have known in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence that the conveyance was being used, had been used, was intended to be 
used or had been intended to be used in any manner described in subsection (a)(4) of [37-2744]. 
S.B. 1419 As Amended, 48th Leg., 2nd Sess., 1986 Idaho Session Laws 712. 
3 The word "sale" was amended to "distribution" in 1972. S.B. 1635, 41st Leg., 2nd 
Sess., 1972 Idaho Session Laws 1199. 
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§ 37-2732(c).4 H.B. 640, Centennial Leg., 2nd Sess., 1990 Idaho Session Laws 852. The 
language that was struck in 1990 was the reference to the specified possession violations. In 
explaining the rationale for striking the language, the Legislature focused on the word 
"transport." The Statement of Purpose for RS 23871 5 indicates the Legislature was not 
discussing trafficking (for the purpose of distribution or receipt of) but was only discussing the 
transport of drugs. The Committee Minutes for RS 23871 [HB 640] state: "Because of an 
oversight, the present statute states that if LSD is being transported, the conveyance is not subject 
to forfeiture. This new legislation would correct this." Hearing on RS 23871 Before the House 
Judiciary, Rules & Administrative Comm., Centennial Leg., 2nd Sess. (Feb. 13, 1990) (emphasis 
in original). In the Senate Committee, the Minutes for House Bill 640 state: "HB 640 would 
4Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4)(C) referenced all of § 37-2732(c) until 1986. In 1986, 
§ 37-2744(a)(4)(C) was amended and limited: "A conveyance is not subject to forfeiture for a 
violation of section 37-2732(c)(2)." S.B. 1419 As Amended. At the time of this change in 1986, 
§ 37-273 2( c )(2) referenced possession of a nonnarcotic drug classified as schedule I and 
controlled substances classified in schedules III, IV and V. The penalty for the possession was a 
misdemeanor. 
In 1989, the Legislature amended Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) adding a new provision 
between (c)(1) and (c)(2); hence, the new § 37-2732(c)(2) stated: "Any person who violates this 
subsection and has in his possession lysergic acid diethylamide is guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years, or fined not more than five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) or both." H.B. 257, Centennial Leg., 1 st Sess., 1989 Idaho Session 
Laws 656. Idaho Code § 27-2744(4)(C) was not changed. The result was that in 1989, a 
conveyance could not be forfeited for transporting LSD but the conveyance could be forfeited for 
transporting all other drugs, even ifthe penalty was a misdemeanor. 
5 "The purpose of this amendment is to repeal the section of the forfeiture law that 
immunizes a person transporting LSD from forfeiture of his or her conveyance." Statement of 
Purpose, RS 23871, H.B. 640, Centennial Leg., 2nd Sess. (1990). 
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repeal the section of the forfeiture law that immunizes a person transporting LSD from forfeiture 
of his or her conveyance." Hearing on HB. 640 Before the Senate Judiciary and Rules Comm., 
Centennial Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mar. 19,1990). 
By looking at the language that the 1990 Legislature was repealing and the Committee 
Minutes, it is clear that the Legislature was tying possession of a controlled substance to the 
transport of that substance. Although the Legislature was focused on the transport of LSD, the 
Legislature made the decision to remove the exception for violations found in Idaho Code 
§ 37-2732(c). Rubey plead guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c), the same statutory provision that the legislature removed from Idaho 
Code § 37-2744(a)(4)(C) in 1990 to ensure that possession would result in civil forfeiture of a 
conveyance. Rubey's reading of the statute would immunize a person transporting 
methamphetamine from forfeiture of his motorcycle. Based on the record of Legislative intent, 
that is not what the Legislature intended. The legislative history of the statute clearly shows that 
from its enactment, the Legislature intended to make conveyances transporting drugs subject to 
forfeiture. 
2. Federal Law, on which Idaho Code § 37-2744(4) was Based, Indicates that 
the Transportation of Controlled Substances is Separate from Facilitating 
the Transportation for the Purpose of Distribution or Receipt of Controlled 
Substances. 
When Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970, the intent of section 511 of that Act was that all conveyances used, or intended for use, to 
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transport or conceal controlled substances in violation of the act were subject to forfeiture. H.R. 
Rep. No. 91-1444, at 4623 (1970). In 1971, the Idaho Legislature began the process of enacting 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in Idaho with H.B. No. 261. The purpose of the Idaho 
legislation was "[t]o conform Idaho's drug laws with the new federal drug laws which go into 
effect May 1, 1971." Hearing on HB. 261 Before the House Printing & Legislative Expense 
Comm., 41st Leg., 1st Extraord. Sess. (Mar. 2,1971). 
The original federal statute (21 U.S.C. § 881) provided in relevant part: 
All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), 
(2), or (9). 
R. at 437. The original Idaho statute is very similar to the original federal statute and states: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for 
the purpose of sale or receipt of [controlled substances]. 
H.B. 261, Idaho Code § 37-2477(a)(4) (1971). In a case from 1977 interpreting 21 U.S.C § 881, 
the claimant was charged with illegal possession of marijuana on a boat. United States v. One 
Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1977). The claimant argued that the statute 
"should be construed to require forfeiture only where a vessel had been used in illegal drug 
trafficking, not where a quantity of illicit drugs for personal consumption has been found in a 
vessel." Id. at 11. The First Circuit disagreed with the claimant and stated: "The plain meaning 
of 'to transport' is simply to carry or convey from one place to another." Id. 
- 10 -
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has also upheld the forfeiture of a car that had 
transported "the remains of a marijuana cigarette in the ashtray." United States v. One 1986 
Mercedes Benz Vin WD-BEA20D2GA143459, 846 F. 2d 2,4 (2nd Cir. 1988). In United States v. 
1990 Toyota 4Runner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished transport from 
facilitating the transportation, finding that to transport is a separate clause from any manner to 
facilitate the transportation. 9 F.3d 651, 652 (7th Cir. 1993). In Toyota 4Runner, the claimant 
drove the Toyota to the meeting where arrangements were made to bring heroin into the United 
States, but the Toyota did not actually transport the heroin in the vehicle. Id. at 651. The 
Seventh Circuit found the Toyota was used in the claimant's drug business and therefore 
facilitated the attempted transportation. Id. at 653. 
The federal courts' interpretation of the federal statute is that "to transport" and "to 
facilitate transportation for the purpose of receipt" are separate actions. Since the purpose of the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act in Idaho in 1971 was to conform Idaho's drug laws with 
federal drug laws, the federal courts' decisions offer persuasive evidence that to transport should 
be read separately from facilitating transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt. 
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3. Tennessee and New Mexico, States with Similar Conveyance Forfeiture 
Statutes, have Interpreted the Statute as To Transport Being a Separate 
Action from Facilitating the Transportation for the Purpose of Distribution 
and Receipt. 
Many of the states adopted the federal statute6 that did not contain the language "for the 
purpose of sale or receipt of' while a few states like Tennessee, New Mexico and Idaho, adopted 
statutes that included the "for the purpose of sale or receipt of' language. "[T]he Idaho 
legislature included a 'uniformity of interpretation' provision [in the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act], which directs that the Idaho act shall be applied and construed to make uniform 
the law with respect to the subject of the act among those states that enact it." State v. Barraza-
Martinez, 139 Idaho 624, 626, 84 P.3d 560, 562 (2003). The Idaho Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act should be construed to make it uniform with states that have already interpreted a 
similar section of the Act. 
In 1985, Tennessee's statute, including its punctuation, was nearly identical to Idaho's 
initial statute: 7 
6 All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended 
for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 
concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9). R. at 437. 
7 Further evidence that the Tennessee statute was similar to Idaho's, is that the Tennessee 
statute also had a subsection (c) provision that stated the conveyance was not subject to forfeiture 
for a violation of the possession statute. Hughes v. State Dept. of Safety, 776 S.W.2d 111, 112 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). This Tennessee provision appears to be similar to Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744(a)(4)(C) which was repealed in 1990. 
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[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for 
the purpose of the sale or receipt of [controlled substances]. 
Tennessee Code Annotated § 53-11-409(a)(4) (1978). Idaho's statute in 1971 8 read: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for 
the purpose of sale or receipt of [controlled substances]. 
H.B. 261, Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) (1971). In Interpreting the Tennessee statute, the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Featherston v. Wood, noted that the vehicle in question had not 
been used to transport contraband. 1985 WL 4551, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1985). The 
Court stated: 
It is true that the statute describes the transportation as being for the purpose of 
sale or receipt; but the phrase, 'for the purpose of sale or receipt' describes and 
limits the word, 'transportation' and does not describe and extend the words, 'to 
facilitate' which are limited only by the word 'transportation.' 
!d. at *4; Hughes v. State Dept. of Safety, 776 S.W.2d 111, 112-113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). The 
Tennessee statute, like the Idaho statute, had two verbs: "to transport" and "to facilitate." 
According to the Tennessee Court's interpretation, the phrase "for the purpose of sale or receipt" 
does not modify the verb to facilitate but rather modifies the noun "transportation" that follows 
the verb "to facilitate." If the phrase does not modify the verb to facilitate, then it cannot be read 
to modify the verb "to transport" which occurs earlier in the statute. 
8 The Legislature amended the statute in 1972 adding: [A]ll conveyances, including 
aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to 
facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the purpose of sale 
or receipt of [controlled substances]. H.B. 627 
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New Mexico also had a similar provision in its early forfeiture statute. New Mexico's 
prior statute, including its punctuation, was nearly identical to the Idaho civil forfeiture statute. 
The 1978 New Mexico statute stated: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for 
the purpose of the sale of [controlled substances]. 
New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 30-31-34 (1978). In interpreting the New Mexico statute, the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico found that "transportation need not be for the purpose of sale." 
Matter of FOlfeiture, 673 P.2d 1310, 1312 (N.M. 1983).9 
Since Idaho's Uniform Controlled Substances Act is almost identical to the statutes in two 
states that have interpreted the specific statutory provision at issue, it is persuasive evidence that 
Idaho's statute should be construed to make it uniform with the states that have already 
interpreted the Act. In order to make it uniform, there should be a finding that transporting a 
controlled substance is sufficient for the civil forfeiture of the conveyance. 
B. The Decisions of Idaho Courts Support Civil Forfeiture of Conveyances, such as 
Motorcycles, Used to Transport Methamphetamine. 
The recent Court of Appeals decision, State of Idaho v. Key, 149 Idaho 691, 239 P.3d 796 
(Ct. App. 2010) is of importance, and supports the interpretation that transportation of a 
9 The New Mexico Legislature has since amended its statute removing three commas. 
The most significant one was between "to transport" and "or" so it now reads: "to transport or in 
any manner to facilitate the transportation ... " State ex reI. Dept. of Public Safety v. Ortega, 857 
P.2d 44,47 (N.M. 1993). In Ortega, the New Mexico Court found that because the statute had 
been modified with the removal of commas, forfeiture was allowed only when a vehicle 
contained a controlled substance for the purpose of sale. Id. at 49. 
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controlled substance is sufficient for forfeiture of a vehicle. The facts in Key are strikingly 
similar to this case. In the Key case, 5.23 ounces of marijuana was found in a backpack inside 
Key's car. Id., at 693, 239 P.3d at 798. In this case, Rubey was found with 13 grams of 
methamphetamine inside his jacket after Rubey dismounted his motorcycle. Key was charged 
with possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. Id. Rubey was charged with possession 
of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Key pled guilty to possession of marijuana as part of 
a plea agreement. Id. Rubey plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine as part of a plea 
agreement. 
The state, in the criminal proceeding, argued that Key's car "should be forfeited on the 
basis that it had been used to possess and transport the large amount of marijuana found in the 
backpack." Id. at 694, 239 P.3d at 799. The Prosecuting Attorney, in the civil proceeding, 
argued that Rubey's motorcycle should be forfeited because it was used to transport 
methamphetamine. Key argued that since she had pled guilty to possession "as opposed to 
possession with an intent to deliver, there was no evidence that the vehicle was used to facilitate 
possession of the marijuana." !d. Rubey argues that under Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) 
possession and transport of methamphetamine is not sufficient for a forfeiture; instead, the Court 
must find that the vehicle was used or intended for use for the purposes of distribution or receipt 
of methamphetamine in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. R. at 379,385. 
In Key, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not err in finding that 
Key's vehicle had been used to facilitate her possession offense such that it was subject to 
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criminal forfeiture. Id. at 705,239 P.3d at 810. The Magistrate Court concluded that "the plain 
language of the statute [ ] will not require the Plaintiff, in a civil forfeiture case, [to] prove the 
criminal elements of distribution of methamphetamine or receipt of methamphetamine." 
R. at 325. 
The criminal forfeiture statute provides forfeiture for: "Any of the person's property 
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of 
such violation." Idaho Code § 37-2801(2). The civil forfeiture statute provides: "[A]ll 
conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, posseSSIOn or 
concealment, for the purpose of sale or receipt" of controlled substances. Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744(a)(4). The Court of Appeals in Key distinguished the criminal forfeiture statute from 
the civil forfeiture statute. The Court stated that the criminal forfeiture statute is different from 
the civil forfeiture statute because the criminal forfeiture statute "limits criminal forfeiture to 
property that facilitated the crime for which the defendant has been convicted." Key, at 702,239 
P.3d at 808 (citing State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 675, 84 P.3d 1038, 1043 (Ct. App. 2004». 
However, Rubey is in essence arguing that the civil forfeiture statute should be construed in the 
same manner as the criminal statute, and that civil forfeiture of a vehicle cannot occur unless the 
vehicle facilitated the specific crime of delivery or receipt of methamphetamine. Such a 
requirement is not in keeping with the Court of Appeals' decisions or the civil forfeiture statute. 
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In fact, the Court of Appeals, citing Stevens, stated it is not necessary in a criminal 
forfeiture to have evidence that a vehicle was used to acquire drugs, but only that there is some 
connection between the drugs and the vehicle. Key, at 704, 239 P.3d at 809. The Court found 
that Key's possession of drugs in her car created the "requisite connection between the drugs and 
the vehicle" to warrant a criminal forfeiture. The Court of Appeals explained there is a "more 
difficult burden to prove a relationship" between a conveyance and the conviction of a specific 
offense in a criminal forfeiture. Stevens, 139 Idaho at 675,84 P.3d at 1043. If transporting drugs 
in a vehicle is sufficient for a criminal forfeiture, and there is a more difficult burden to prove a 
relationship between a vehicle and an offense in a criminal proceeding, it seems illogical that the 
Legislature intended that transporting drugs on a motorcycle should be insufficient for a civil 
forfeiture. 
As the Court of Appeals found in Stevens, the difference between criminal and civil 
forfeiture is the nexus between the crime and the item being forfeited. ld. The Court of Appeals 
found that Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) was similar to 21 U.S.C § 881 "in that it does not limit 
forfeitures to property connected with the specific offense for which a defendant has been 
convicted." ld. Rubey argues that the "civil forfeiture action must be based upon the use of a 
vehicle for the purpose of distribution or receipt of a controlled substance that was possessed or 
distributed in violation of the act." R. at 379. Rubey's interpretation would simply eviscerate the 
difference between criminal and civil forfeiture. Congress and the Idaho Legislature would not 
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have created both the criminal and civil forms of forfeiture if they both required the same nexus 
between crime and the item forfeited. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) is ambiguous. In the face of ambiguity, this Court 
determines the intent of the Idaho Legislature. The legislative history of Idaho Code § 37-
2477(a)(4) and § 37-2732(c) indicate an intent by the Idaho Legislature to allow the forfeiture of 
conveyances for transporting controlled substances. In addition, federal case law, state case law 
from other states with similar statutory provisions, and related Idaho case law all support the 
interpretation that the Legislature intended the civil forfeiture of a conveyance when the 
conveyance is transporting controlled substances. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2012. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Defuty Prosecuting Attorney 
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